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A major theme that emerged from our seminar discussion of 
social justice was the way in which gender cross-cuts concepts of 
justice and processes by which justice is derived and realized. 
There was, first, the discussion following a presentation by 
the Honorable Harry Edwards (1987). Judge Edwards as well as 
many feminists have cautioned about going outside the legal- 
judicial system to resolve conflicts. Since at least 
theoretically the justice system provides each person equal 
access and ttblindtt justice that does not discriminate, we will, 
these critics warn, choose alternative forms at the risk of 
exposing women, minorities, the underclasses to all of the ills 
of a system whose relevant protections are unkown. Since the 
legal system is surrounded and reinforced (sanctified?) by 
tradition and ritual that have developed through accretion over 
hundreds of years, the authority it carries is incomparable. 
Having won reforms that make the system more nearly equal for all 
*The Program on Conflict Management Alternatives at the 
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funded by the Hewlett Foundation and the University. Other 
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Chesler, James Crowfoot, Barbara Israel, Charles Moody, Helen 
Weingarten, Christine Whitman, Edith Lewis and Barry Checkoway. 
The first part of this working paper summarizes some of the 
discussions in the seminar during the winter of 1986. The 
seminar group critiqued the paper in an earlier draft and added 
significantly to its value. Any errors or limitations of the 
paper are, however, my own. 
citizens, we should be cautious about starting all over with a 
new system. New systems are introduced by people from more 
powerful groups and, in all likelihood, protect the interests of 
those groups. 
Edwardsr position is a strong form of one held by many 
feminists who warn that in divorce cases particularly, the male 
is usually in the advantaged position and can hide resources 
since he has all the financial information. The suspicion of 
many feminists is that no-fault divorce and divorce mediation are 
inventions of the dominant male culture designed to protect it 
from the power of the subpoena. (Weissman, 1980) Laura Nader 
suggests on the basis of a sophisticated historical analysis that 
themovement for alternatives to the court system, justified as a 
means of clearing court dockets of excess and "minorw conflicts, 
was in fact a method for keeping the claims of women and 
minorities out of the courts as movements for equality stimulated 
the independent voices of these previously disenfranchised 
groups. By encouraging the growth of ADR, the courts could be 
kept for claims that were more authentic and important (that is, 
conflicts involving men and property). (Nader, 1987) 
At the same time, paradoxically, women professionals have 
been in the forefront of the development of alternative systems. 
The legal system, based on litigation and an adversarial model, 
is one that most women enter with ease and comfort. Even 
women attorneys have traditionally chosen fields that allowed 
them to practice before administrative boards or in other less 
adversarial settings. Competition, contention, combat are 
central elements in male socialization but are distonic with the 
experience and socialization of females. Women are raised to be 
caretakers and peacemakers (Gilligan, 1982; Ruddick, 1980; Douvan 
and Kaboolian, 1984). They tend to see conflict as a problem to 
be solved rather than an inevitable social consequence of limited 
resources. They seek to contextualize problems before imposing 
judgment; they want to enlarge the picture through reframing and 
discovering new, previously unrealized resources. (Gilligan, 
1982; Weingarten and Douvan, 1984). All of these predilections 
orient women to the alternative forms of dispute resolution: to 
mediation, negotiation, conciliation. 
The legal-judicial system differs from alternative forms in 
ways that neatly parallel differences between men's and women's 
approaches to moral dilemmas. It relies on formal rules and 
seeks to distribute limited goods in a just manner, i.e., 
according to a process that is rule-governed and treats the 
interests of all parties equally. It assumes real conflict in 
all cases and assumes as well that conflict will be solved by 
adversarial procedures before a person or body that renders 
judgment. The alternate forms assume that conflict is sometimes 
the result of misunderstanding of the partiesf interests, that 
the common interest of partners as well as their differences 
should be explored, and that conflicts can sometimes be resolved 
in a win-win rather than a zero-sum manner. Alternative 
procedures are most often and most successfully employed in 
situations where the disputants must maintain a relationsip 
despite conflicts that arise. The judicial system can in many 
cases assume that the parties will end their relationship with 
the litigation. The alternative systems attempt to resolve 
conflicts in a way that protects and conserves the relationship 
and creates the capacity for implementing the resolution and 
future problem solving (e.g., in labor-management relations the 
contract provides. a mechanism for solving conflicts that arise 
between negotiation sessions). 
Gilligan (1982) sees the justice system as the model of male 
moral thought and uses it as a foil for differentiating the moral 
development characterist of women. Kohlberg (198) thinks of it 
as the apex of a universal construction of.moral issues and in 
this assumption, suggests Gilligan, Kohlberg reflects his male 
bias and limited view. In her research on moral development, 
Gilligan found that women's course of development differed from 
menf s but was not, as ~ohlber~ concluded, truncated at a wlowertl 
developmental stage. Whereas men's moral thought focuses on 
rights and the "fairw distribution of limited goods and reaches 
its highest form in universalistic concepts of justice, women's 
moral thought has responsibility and care-taking at its center 
and follows a distinct developmental course that differs from the 
male model. Male morality starts from the separated individual 
and his claims, while women's moral thought begins with the 
assumption of attachment and interdependence. Women are 
preeminently concerned with protecting and enhancing 
relationships.** 
**Kohlberg did come to see that universal concepts of justice 
needed to be tempered by compassion, but his theory held the 
former to be the highest form of moral thought. 
Women's need to contextualize dilemmas before making 
judgments and their greater tendency to delay judgment is 
connected to their care-giving role. Recent research in which 
men and women were asked to aenerate a real-life dilemma found 
that women, compared to men, more often describe dilemmas that 
involve care-taking. And both men and women find such dilemmas 
more difficult to resolve than llconflict of rights" dilemmas. 
(Ford and Lowery, 1986) In the seminar we recognized that having 
complete knowledge of the context in which an event occurred, 
having full information available, tends to soften judgment and 
make decisive action more difficult. It is a condition that men, 
bureaucracies, and states at war want at all costs to avoid. 
In our analysis of theories of social justice, another 
notable difference seemed to be gender linked. In each of the 
theories we considered (Rawls, 1971; Rorty, 1980; Nozick, 1974; 
Habermas, 1978; Ruddick, 1980; Gewirth, 1982; Walzer, 1983; 
Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet, 1983) assumptions are made about 
the basic values that are to be protected and that underlie 
definitions of justice. To adjudicate differences, all parties 
to the dispute and the community must agree about some 
underlying, fundamental community values. Or they must at least 
consent to have disputes resolved within the community values 
context. 
The question arises: how, by what process, are community 
values arrived at? How is consensus or agreement achieved? In 
Rawlsf theory, dominant in the field at the present time, 
agreement about fundamental values is reached by a process in 
which parties all strip themselves of their roles and individual 
interests as they enter deliberations. If each person does this, 
Rawls holds, then the group will arrive.at consensus. The theory 
is, in other words, that the only thing separating us are the 
social fictions of role and status. If we adopt a view that is 
non-constrained (by role and self-interest), then we will all see 
the same basic or ultimate value position. We will arrive at the 
universal basis for just decisions. 
This assumption -- that except for our being ensconced in 
particular status positions, we would all apprehend the same 
ultimate values -- underlies a great deal of public discourse in 
western industrial democracies. When we send representatives to 
Congress, they are to adopt this stance of abstract principle, to 
shed their narrow self-interest and the interest of their 
constituencies, and act for "the public good." Senators, in 
particular, are to be statesmen rather than log-rollers and pork- 
barrel dealers. They are to argue and vote for the right, the 
just, for proposals that represent the best interests of the 
nation rather than particular vested interests. Judges and other 
public arbiters are to assume the same dispassionate, non- 
invested posture in order to seek and deliver just outcomes. 
Members of executive committees and boards of directors in 
organizations and institutions who act as advisers or share in 
executive decision making are expected to behave in similar ways, 
with a degree of aesthetic distance from the various interests 
competing for resources, and guided by the central values of the 
whole organization. 
Social critics of the left - representing those who are 
excluded from the power centers in society - have criticized 
theories built on the idea of this theoretical statesman stripped 
of self-interest, pointing to compelling evidence that judges and 
their decisions represent the existing power structure, that 
senators vote in accord with the dominant power interests of 
their home consitutencies (and are often directly or indirectly 
in the pay of these interests), that executive committee 
decisions often reflect vulgar and blatant self-interest in 
obvious ways. 
It should be noted that Rawls' assumption is Platonic in 
that it implies an antecedent reality, that is, an existence of 
fundamental values aside from their soical construction. 
According to this view, if we can but eliminate the distorting 
lens of our separate social roles, we will all see the same basic 
values. 
It is also true that, in one sense, his thought is similar 
to our struggle to find a way to motivate people to take a 
disinterested and communal responsibility for the welfare of 
their brothers/sisters. We played with the thought that if one 
were able to get people to imagine that one or more of their own 
children might be born into or work themselves into a 
disadvantaged position in society (e.g., through disabilities or 
bad decisions and luck), might they (the people we are trying to 
involve in a more communal responsibility) not give up something 
of their own current affluence in order to establish a societal 
order in which the least advantaged could still have a decent 
life? To make it more contemporaneous, would they be willing to 
give up some private gain in order to invest in a public space 
that is safer and more humane? 
The comparison with Rawls is just this: in imagination we 
are asking that the citizen give up hislher position of privilege 
(i.e., strip the self of status and associated roles) and look at 
things from the point of view of someone who is disadvantaged 
(their own downwardly mobile son or daughter). We bring it close 
(i.e., one's own progeny) in order to stimulate empathy and make 
the imaginative leap easier. In a sense when Rawls asserts that 
group members will come to agree on values if they strip 
themselves of roles, he is perhaps saying that we need to make 
the imaginative leap into the position of the least advantaged 
member of the community. His whole superstructure built on the 
assumed community of values seems to support this point of 
comparison. It should be noted, however, that Rawlsf 
construction and the one developed in the seminar differ more 
sharply than this noted commonality implies. While Rawls 
presents his ideal as a highly abstract, decontextualized 
individual, we are closer to the feminist position in trying to 
provide a concrete, vivid, and compelling affective reality 
within which people would be asked to make their choices. 
Whatever else one may say for Rawlsf conception of the 
mechanism for deriving concensual values -- the basis for 
adjudicating conflicts -- it clearly is a construction that 
women theorists would be likely to advance. All of the aspects 
of women's moral stance that Gilligan describes would militate 
against women arriving at such an abstract basis for judgment. 
Women, Gilligan theorizes, draw their morality from their 
experience as care givers. They find morality - the basis for 
moral choice - in dense social interaction and the balance of 
human needs. They need and want the details of context in order 
to make a judgment among moral claims. They negotiate among 
competing needs and derive their morality from the process of 
balancing among needs and providing care for those who are most 
vulnerable and least able to take care of themselves. Rather 
than stripping the parties of their roles and interests in order 
to come to consensus about values, women would have all parties 
enter the negotiation with their roles and interests explicit so 
that thick social exchange can develop and lead through 
contextualized reality to consensus. The idea of parties 
shedding their roles and statuses in order to engage in 
decontextualized discussion of values is entirely alien to 
women's view of social reality. 
~eminist theories support the gender relationship being 
suggested here. Sara Ruddick (1980), Jean Elshtain (1982) and 
Mary otBrien (1981) are representative feminist social theorists 
concerned with social justice. Each of them grounds social 
values in some aspect of the parent role. Ruddick, whose theory 
is more developed in this regard, suggests that it is the 
experience of parenting dependent infants that provides the 
ground for universal and fundamental values that relate the 
individual to human life, to nature, and to society. Through the 
development of "attentive lovett in the parenting role, 
individuals learn the ultimate values of conserving human life, 
collaborating with nature, and assuming a critical stance toward 
society's norms as one transmits them to the child in the 
socialization process. . Common values develop out of the 
experience of the commonly held, contextualized role of 
caretaker. 
Of the many social justice theories that we explored, only 
Habermas of all the male theorists assumes a mechanism for the 
growth of consensus that is defined by substantive exchange. The 
process he describes -- the ideal speech situation -- shares with 
feminist theories a reliance on social interaction of peop1e.b 
roles rather than asserting a process that depends on individuals 
stripping themselves of their roles, experience, and personal 
interests. 
The meanins and intesration of difference 
Underpinning theories of social justice are implicit 
assumptions about the meaning, the significance of difference(s): 
how we will view difference, what we think needs to be done to 
integrate difference(s) into a theory of social justice, how 
difference or diversity relates to concepts of the just society. 
Again, I detect a gender difference in the emphasis and 
meanings attributed to difference. At the moment it is only an 
hypothesis but one for which I find compelling anecdotal 
evidence. 
I asked each of two male colleagues (colleagues with whom I 
work closely and share virtually all important value positions) 
whether they thought that all differences implied a ranking or 
evaluation; that difference would set off in the human mind the 
tendency to rank and evaluate, to assign each of the pair the 
position of Itbetter" or lnworse.w 
Both of my respondents said yes. The first man said "Yes, 
absolutely." I think he meant both that people would tend to 
impose an evaluative frame on any difference and that in some 
sense evaluation, the comparative reference inheres in 
difference. 
My second respondent was somewhat more conditional: "There 
will always be that tendency, the urge to rank, evaluate. 
Therefore it is important to see that all differences do not 
separate people or objects in exactly the same way, along the 
same 'fault-linef, as it were. In the case of people or groups 
of people, this becomes critical, not to classify people in a way 
that always adheres to the line of evaluation. In prejudice and 
strereotypy, that's exactly what happens: the outgroup is 
assigned all of the negative human qualities, all those aspects 
of human life that have been devalued and that the dominant group 
wants to disown. 
I was dumbfounded by these answers. It seems to me that all 
kinds of differences observed every day are in no way connected 
to evaluation, to any explicit or implicit ranking of better or 
less good. To assume that any difference will lead to or require 
evaluation seems to me to require a totally ahistorical, non- 
developmental, static view of reality (including the reality of 
the human psyche), and a view that drains reality of some 
enormous portion of its rich complexity. 
I think the identification of difference with value ranking 
could only be made by people who have not experienced difference 
in their most central and self-defining roles and life activities 
or who have experienced difference only in realms that are 
completely structured and dominated by a hierarchical social 
construction. No one, it seems to me, who has been a primary 
caretaker of an infant or toddler for a significant period of 
time (6 months or more, say) could make such an identification 
without denying or radically distorting their own experience. As 
one waggish mother has put the question of evaluating various 
stages of development: "Is it better to be older and have most 
of your mistakes behind you, or younger with your mistakes still 
to look forward to?" The impossibility of answering this 
question signals the absurdity of the attempt.*** 
Caring for dependent children is not the only experience 
that encourages one to appreciate difference in a non-evaluative 
way. Many people who are not parents, who have had relatively 
little contact with childraising have positive attitudes toward 
and pleasure in difference. Nor does parenting always succeed in 
creating a non-evaluative frame for encountering difference. We 
know that many parents compare and evaluate their children and 
***Another example of trying to squeeze a plural reality into a 
monolithic evaluative scheme comes from another of my colleagues. 
Having recently become an Associate Dean, this person wondered 
how the University could handle the morale problems of all those 
professors who did not get to be deans. After all, he said, 
there are 2,000 members of the faculty and only 5 or 6 deanships. 
It had obviously not occurred to him that motivation varies and 
that while he was eager to become dean and have the power to make 
decisions that would affect us all, there are those in the 
faculty who do not want the power and, indeed, some who would 
rather go to prison than become deans. 
that there have been systems of childraising based on the 
conception of the child as an animal in need of humanization 
through a stern process of socialization (thus always employing a 
comparative frame). Sarah Ruddick (1980) explores the message 
transmitted to children in conventional families when the mother 
- all-powerful in the child's view during the work day while the 
father is at work - defers to the father when he comes home. 
Clearly many mothers, expressing their internalized oppression, 
adopt the comparative stance in their dealings with their 
children. 
Any human capacity can be distorted by culture and specific 
training. Nonetheless, continuous interaction with dependent 
children is a powerful experience that will tend to produce in 
the caretaker a fresh view of human possibility and a fresh 
apprehension of the value and beauty of human variation. The 
experience is powerful in part because at least on the child's 
part it is unmediated. It is a wfull-frontll relationship: the 
child is fully present and unreserved, on the edge of the 
encounter, whole and original, full of the unexpected. And the 
adult, particularly perhaps when it is a parent interacting with 
her/his own progeny, is likely to be relatively open, undefended, 
in love. 
~nteraction with a small child is also quintessentially 
developmental. The child is changing daily; the full-face 
relationship of yesterday changes into the newly arranged 
relationship of today. The adult is interacting with the child 
as s/he is and, at the same time, with a concept of the future 
child always entering and conditioning the interaction. The 
child will change, tipping previous patterns enough to keep the 
adult slightly off balance and therefore open to apprehending the 
child and the relationship anew as it is rather than as ideology 
or past conceptions would have it. (Past myths will affect the 
relationship, but the developmental character of the relationship 
will tend to influence it toward unfiltered conceptions and 
interactions.) 
Any unmediated primary relationship will have the capacity 
to teach people that difference can be engaging and pleasurable 
rather than frightening, and that two people (or qualities or 
objects) can be different yet equal in value, treasured for their 
differences that one would not want to undo or homogenize. 
In a faculty discussion about diversity in the University, I 
suggested that in intelligence and motivation we would like our 
students to be uniform, but in most other characteristics (taste, 
interests, experience, background), diversity is the condition 
most likely to produce creativity, insight, interest, and 
excitement and to lead to new knowledge. A colleague from 
~ngineering said, no, we need diversity even in intelligence for, 
after all, someone has to be in the lowest quartile of our 
classes. A woman from the Medical School said that although they 
might be the lowest quartile of our students, they would still be 
brighter and more motivated than most college students in the 
nation. It depended, in other words, on how one framed the 
comparison. 
We can extend her point: In fact, someone has to be in the 
lowest quartile on ability only if we define ability as a 
unidimensional characteristic. If we recognize that the students 
who are in the lowest decile in their French language class may 
be in the top percentile in math or biology or economics (and 
vice versa), then it is anything but obvious that someone has to 
be "the least able." The minute we enlarge and enrich our 
definition of ability. -- beyond a single dimension measured on 
some equal interval scale -- the possibility of simple evaluation 
dims. Or, closer to the truth, we may evaluate these various 
patterns of ability (e.g., we may prefer students who can speak 
French over those who speak mathematics), but it will become 
clear that such evaluation is a matter of taste and personal' 
preference, not an objective rating of worth. 
Reducing. life, personality, reality to a single dimension is 
the ultimate degradation. It clearly distorts reality, and it 
also reduces the psychological complexity and differentiation of 
the person who does it. Another academic example: Many of.my 
colleagues in the graduate faculty make it strikingly clear that 
they are not interested in teaching or working with students who 
are not Ittop grade." By Iftop gradew is meant someone who is 
palpably like the professor himself. A superbly bright eccentric 
student, a student who wants to combine psychology and literature 
(or anthropology or music) a shy and inarticulate student -- all 
of these are consigned to the.degraded category. Students are 
either "top gradew or they are nothing; collegues are either 
llstarslv or "turkeys. 
In their radical reduction of reality into such simplistic 
and crude categories,.these academics demostrate one of the prime 
characteristics .of prejudice; the dedifferentiation of a complex 
reality into an outgroup and an ingroup, the characteristic 
oversimplificaiton of prejudice, ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, 
fanaticism. If you -are not in the covenant then you are damned. 
An early Spanish playwright described one of his characters, 
a decadent and despotic aristocrat, in the following succinct 
way: "He was afraid whenever he looked i-nto the eyes of the 
other and did not see himself." 
The willingness and capacity to confront difference without 
fearing loss of control and without immediately having to 
categorize and evaluate elements, the capacity to tolerate 
complexity and ambiguity -- these are products of education, and 
in some real sense they are marks of a cultivated and 
differentiated consciousness. 
In studies of incoming college students, when we ask what 
they hope to get out of their college experience, what their 
goals in coming to college are, young males most often give 
vocational goals - in either general or quite specific terms; 
young women give some vocational answers but are more likely (and 
much more likely than males) to say that they want to widen their 
experience and deveop their own minds and interests and that they 
hope to meet many different kinds of people. 
This attraction to and interest in diversity -- and 
students' expection that their women teachers will entertain a 
broader spectrum of interests -- contributes to another commonly 
observed difference in the relationships of graduate students to 
their male and female mentors. Male professors more often have 
true apprentices who work on problems directly stemming from the 
faculty member's research program, who come out of their graduate 
experience formed into younger versions of the male professor. 
They continue to work on problems associated with their mentor, 
and they maintain close relations with the mentor who, at 
minimum, has gotten them a first job. The maverick students and 
those whose interest are not directly formed by faculty are more 
likely to work with women faculty. Women are less likely to have 
the kind of internal certainty that would allow them to mold a 
student directly to their own image, and because they are likely 
to be more marginal to the academic enterprise, they are also 
more likely to attract non-standard students.+ 
Ten years ago academic departments were faced with a crisis: 
we were producing more Ph.D.s than we could place. In the course 
of a departmental discussion of the problem, it was striking to 
me how many of my male colleagues assumed that their students 
would want to become just like them. The chairman told of 
finishing graduate school, taking a research job at a 
distinguished technical University, and finding after a very 
short time that this job -- despite its many satisfactions -- was 
+The desire to mold a student is a construction that tends to be 
unlearned in the process of raising dependent children, according 
to ~uddick's theory. One outcome of this process, and a feature 
of what she refers to as ggmaternal thinkingfgg is a recognition 
that one collaborates with nature rather than dominating it. 
~eminists and other critics of industrial culture make the point 
that the western construciton that sees nature as a force to be 
dominated and tamed to the needs and self-interest of I1manw is a 
specifically male conception. 
not what he wanted to do and not what he had had in mind 
throughtout graduate school. What he had intended to be was a 
professor just like the chairman of his committee! Numerous 
affirming, reinforcing statements later (all by males) struck me 
with very great force since of the five students I had worked 
with in the past two years, only one had taken a straight 
academic post. The others had gone to various international 
agencies, to editorial jobs with Psvcholosv Today, or to 
consulting firms. It struck me that students found it easier to 
work with me and yet not take me as a model than it was for them 
to do this with a male faculty. And, as I suggested above, I 
have a much more varied group of students, less standard and less 
conventional, than many of my male colleagues. 
Women may identify less with the value of hierarchical 
ranking that so dominates our culture, in part because they 
understand that in the most primitive, paradigmatic ranking, they 
will be second in a field of two. 
Difference and conflict 
Clearly all differences do not lead to conflict. On the 
other hand, conflict presupposes differences: either a 
difference in what two people (or groups) want, or a similarity 
in what they want and a limited supply of what that is (i.e., a 
difference in their chances of obtaining whatever they want). 
Differences in some characteristics can make resolving conflict 
more difficult because they reduce the possibility of the 
disputants understanding the needs and claims of the other, of 
achieving empathy. Difference, diversity in a group enlarges 
experience, insight, the possibility of reaching original and 
unusual outcomes. Diversity makes exchange, interaction more 
complicated and is the only path to new understanding, fresh 
apprehension of reality, a perspective different from received 
wisdom. # 
Difference in theories of social justice 
At least two kinds of difference are dealt with implicitly 
or explicitly in social justice theory: differences in outcome, 
rewards, and access to resources (class difference) and 
difference or diversity as it affects the process of achieving 
consensual values to guide adjudication of disputes. 
#A line of research in social psychology some 15 years ago showed 
that a small group of executives, faced with a difficult dilemma 
requiring a decision, came to a more "far outN or risky position 
than any of the group members came to individually. This 
fascinating,work and insight, along with most work on group 
effects, has disappeared from the mainstream of social 
psychology. Now the dominant model in social psychology is 
cognitive and intra-psychic; research on powerful group effects 
has been exiled to schools of social work, business, and 
theology. The schools that have greatest contact with the real 
world are not in a position to ignore important sources of 
influence. 
All theories must deal with differences in the distribution 
of skills and talents (i.e., access) and in the distribution of 
social rewards. Three responses to such differences-occur: they 
are denied or recognized; if recognized, they are either accepted 
and justified (even used as measure of moral worth) or they are 
made the object of corrective effort. 
Rawls (1971) recognizes differences in access and advantage 
and seeks to correct them. Individual talents and skills are to 
be deployed in such a way that they benefit the least favored. 
Since nature is unjust, the socius must be arranged in such a way 
that the benefits of unequally distributed gifts of nature will 
accrue to those who are least endowed. Walzer (1983), Deutsch 
(1973), Habermas (1975), Gewirth (1978), Laue (1978), and 
Crowfoot, Chesler, and Boulet (1983) all in one way or another 
(and'despite many other differences) see inequality of access as 
a critical source of injustice, an unjust constraint to be 
recognized and dealt with as a condition for realizing a just 
social order. 
Nozick (1974), on the other hand, recognizes difference in 
access and resources and assumes that these are both natural and 
laudable. Like the fundamentalist Calvinist with his concepts of 
predestination and justification through acts, Nozick sees 
nothing regrettable in radical inequality in the distribution of 
resources. On the contrary, efforts by government to restrict 
untrammeled voluntary contractual acquisition of resources are 
the central source of injustice. Nowhere does he consider the 
question of differences developed in the first place. He 
declares adult competition for self-advancement as the beginning 
of the race. ~ifferences that exist at this point -- differences 
in talent, skill, inherited advantage -- are not questioned. 
What exists is natural and therefore right (or at least not 
changeable). Hoarding when others have nothing is not 
acceptable, but beyond this minimal threshold, self-interested . 
competitive advantage is accepted and valued.@ Interference with 
it defines injustice. 
A paradox in this conservative position -- conservative in 
the specific sense that it seeks to maintain and amplify 
differences in rewards, as well as politically opposed to change 
or to enlarging the role of government -- centers on the value of 
autonomy. On the one hand, autonomy is held to be the highest 
value: any interference with individual contractual acquisition 
of advantage is unjust (indeed defines injustice); at the same 
time, humanity's capacity to affect its fate by altering or 
conditioning the relative advantage to which some people are born 
or by controlling the conditions of "voluntary contractual 
@Class differences were accentuated in what Max Kosloff called 
"the court styleu of the Reagan administration, consisting of 
ftspectacles which positively glow with nostalgia for the anciens 
resimes whose power was sustained through their freedom to 
repress. The new ostentation cloaks itself in a bouffant fantasy 
of that older, absolutist power," He draws a striking connection 
between this insistence on accentuating differences in rewards 
and its moral foundation when he refers to . . . "behavior that 
shocks because it operates in a vacuum -- a moral vacuum 
certainly, but also a historical onew that rests on a "blindered 
version of the past, a view of the aristocracy invoked only to 
serve themselves and their class." While the Administration 
razor slashes away at essential social services, the inner circle 
sensationalizes its own prosperity. The rapid turn away from 
social conscience and with it the enhancement of economic 
disparities, is what the court style seems to affirm.I1 
acquisitionm are negated. We - the social collectivity as well 
as the individual member of society - get one chance, at birth, 
to acquire advantage according to fate, the luck of the draw. 
After that point there can be no social intervention to alter 
one's iniital advantage. Only the individual - equipped well or 
badly by luck at the starting gate -- can affect it now. Any 
collective effort to influence or alter fated arrangements is 
defined as unjust interference with natural process. 
Nozick also represents the denial of difference in access 
and resources in his vision of the process of justice. 
By emphasizing the negotiating process (the voluntary contractual 
process of individual acquisition) and ignoring the conditions 
under which people enter the process, the skills, talents, and 
advantages with which individuals begin the negotiation, he is in 
effect saying that contracting ability does not vary but is the 
same across individuals. 
How do the various theories handle differences in viewpoints 
or interests, the basis for conflict about what consititutes 
justice? Rawls and Habermas are most explicit about this issue 
in their discussions of the process by which the social group 
develops norms of justice. Rawls, we recall, holds that 
consensus will develop in a group if all the members strip 
themselves of their social roles and self-interests. Habermas, 
on the other hand, sees a rational concensus developing out of 
the ideal speech situation, that is, interaction among people who 
are free of external coercion and internalized constraints. 
Ruddick and other feminist theorists place heavy emphasis on 
unmediated contact with dependent infants as an experience 
freighted with meaning that would, if shared, lead to concensus 
about fundamental values to be preserved and shared insight about 
the means and constraints that must be recognized in efforts to 
preserve them. 
Next stem 
There was a time in Western civilization - a long period - 
in which difference was not an object to be worried over or 
analyzed but was, rather, a challenge to colonial and missionary 
powers of influence and/or force. There were always those few 
eccentrics who "went native,I8 remittance men and romantic women 
who apprehended meaning and value in the culturalsystem of the 
outsiders. But by and large the apprehension of difference led 
directly to efforts to convert the other. 
At some point in the last fifty years a sea change brought 
on by the cumulative effects of education, war, travel, and the 
dissemination of ideas from modern anthropology) occurred in our 
cultural system so that by the 1970s when a previously unknown 
group of people was discovered in the Philippines, the first 
response was not to bring them the benefits of civilization - 
sanitation, medicine, genetically superior yam stock, 
christianity - but to let them be. This response - perhaps 
primarily a media response but nonetheless powerful and 
emblematic - reflected a capacity for self-questioning and 
distancing that was, I think, unprecedented in western culture. 
Our missionary zeal was frditiocused on Godless communism by 
this time so that perhaps a failure of energy may also have 
contributed to tolerance toward the small exotic Philippine 
culture. 
The challenge of responding to difference - of managing a 
culture made up of many co-cultures - has not been met very 
successfully in human history. pluralism, with its understanding 
of the critical role of group identifications and history in the 
building of individual human identity remains the dominant effort 
to construct a theoretical underpinning for the task. Dewey 
(1938) and Kallen (1948) are clearly the intellectual forebears 
of deertzt image of a mcollagett of cultures (1985). And that is 
where I suggest we must turn next in our search for an 
intellectual grounding for social justice. 
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